PART I. Of the Expense of Defence.

 The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force.

But the expense both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different in the different states of society, in the different periods of improvement.

 Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior, as well as a hunter.

When he goes to war, either to defend his society, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other societies, he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as when he lives at home.

His society (for in this state of things there is properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense, either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

 Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a warrior.

Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents, or in a sort of covered waggons, which are easily transported from place to place.

The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation according to the different seasons of the year, as well as according to other accidents.

When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of one part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third.

In the dry season, it comes down to the banks of the rivers;

in the wet season, it retires to the upper country.

When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children;

and their old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence, and without subsistence.

The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war.

Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is nearly the same, though the object proposed by it be very different.

They all go to war together, therefore, and everyone does as well as he can.

Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently known to engage in battle.

If they conquer, whatever belongs to the hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory;

but if they are vanquished, all is lost;

and not only their herds and flocks, but their women and children become the booty of the conqueror.

Even the greater part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the sake of immediate subsistence.

The rest are commonly dissipated and dispersed in the desert.

 The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepares him sufficiently for war.

Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javelin, drawing the bow, etc.

are the common pastimes of those who live in the open air, and are all of them the images of war.

When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks, which he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace.

His chief or sovereign (for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort of expense in preparing him for the field;

and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

 An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men.

The precarious subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a greater number to keep together for any considerable time.

An army of shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred thousand.

As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go on from one district, of which they have consumed the forage, to another, which is yet entire;

there seems to be scarce any limit to the number who can march on together.

A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the civilized nations in their neighbourhood;

a nation of shepherds may.

Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America; nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has frequently been in Asia.

The judgment of Thucydides, that both Europe and Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the experience of all ages.

The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan;

and the havock and devastation of Asia have always signalized their union.

The inhabitants of the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds, have never been united but once, under Mahomet and his immediate successors.

Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner.

If the hunting nations of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.

 In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen who have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those coarse and household ones, which almost every private family prepares for its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior, or easily becomes such.

Those who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons.

The hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy.

The necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and to fortify a camp, as well as to inclose a field.

The ordinary pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in the same manner the images of war.

But as husbandmen have less leisure than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes.

They are soldiers but soldiers not quite so much masters of their exercise.

Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth any expense to prepare them for the field.

 Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement, some sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great loss.

When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take the field together.

The old men, the women and children, at least, must remain at home, to take care of the habitation.

All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in small nations of this kind, have frequently done so.

In every nation, the men of the military age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people.

If the campaign, too, should begin after seedtime, and end before harvest, both the husbandman and his principal labourers can be spared from the farm without much loss.

He trusts that the work which must be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed by the old men, the women, and the children.

He is not unwilling, therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign;

and it frequently costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it.

The citizens of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner till after the second Persian war;

and the people of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian war.

The Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest.

The Roman people, under their kings, and during the first ages of the republic, served in the same manner.

It was not till the seige of Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute something towards maintaining those who went to war.

In the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before, and for some time after, the establishment of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with all their immediate dependents, used to serve the crown at their own expense.

In the field, in the same manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king upon that particular occasion.

 In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain themselves at their own expense.

Those two causes are, the progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

 Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it begins after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his business will not always occasion any considerable diminution of his revenue.

Without the intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the greater part of the work which remains to be done.

But the moment that an artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up.

Nature does nothing for him;

he does all for himself.

When he takes the field, therefore, in defence of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the public.

But in a country, of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from those classes, and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as long as they are employed in its service.

 When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and complicated science;

when the event of war ceases to be determined, as in the first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle;

but when the contest is generally spun out through several different campaigns, each of which lasts during the greater part of the year;

it becomes universally necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that service.

Whatever, in time of peace, might be the ordinary occupation of those who go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden upon them.

After the second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners;

and all of them equally hired and paid at the expense of the state.

From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received pay for their service during the time which they remained in the field.

Under the feudal governments, the military service, both of the great lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a certain period, universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead.

 The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude state of society.

In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the former can never exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, both themselves and the other officers of government and law, whom they are obliged to maintain.

In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered the themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field.

Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which pays the expense of their service.

 The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth.

In all the different republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises, was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen.

In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which, under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people were taught their different exercises by different masters.

In this very simple institution consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever to have been at, in preparing its citizens for war.

In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose with those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece.

Under the feudal governments, the many public ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise archery, as well as several other military exercises, were intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well.

Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution of those ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been universally neglected;

and in the progress of all those governments, military exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the people.

 In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time after their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a separate, distinct trade, which constituted the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens;

every subject of the state, whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary occasions, as bound to exercise it.

 The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so, in the progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them.

The state of the mechanical, as well as some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time.

But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens;

and the division of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art.

Into other arts, the division of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a great number.

But it is the wisdom of the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

A private citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very well;

but he certainly would not promote his own interest.

It is the wisdom of the state only, which can render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation;

and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such, that the preservation of their existence required that they should have it.

 A shepherd has a great deal of leisure;

a husbandman, in the rude state of husbandry, has some;

an artificer or manufacturer has none at all.

The first may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises;

the second may employ some part of it;

but the last cannot employ a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether.

Those improvements in husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little leisure as the artificer.

Military exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike.

That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which, in reality, is no more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours.

An industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked;

and unless the state takes some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

 In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the state can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

 It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on.

 Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

 If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to consist in a militia;

if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army.

The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence.

The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some other occupation.

In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier;

in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character;

and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.

 Militias have been of several different kinds.

In some countries, the citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised only, without being, if I may say so, regimented;

that is, without being divided into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he remained at home, seems to have practised his exercises, either separately and independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best;

and not to have been attached to any particular body of troops, till he was actually called upon to take the field.

In other countries, the militia has not only been exercised, but regimented.

In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

 Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of their arms.

Strength and agility of body were of the highest consequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles.

But this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same manner as fencing is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or with his own particular equals and companions.

Since the invention of fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence.

The nature of the weapon, though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts him more nearly so than he ever was before.

All the dexterity and skill, it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough acquired by practising in great bodies.

 Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles, than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their arms.

But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle.

In an ancient battle, there was no noise but what arose from the human voice;

there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or death.

Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him.

In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated.

But the habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

 A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well exercised standing army.

 The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a-month, can never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised every day, or every other day;

and though this circumstance may not be of so much consequence in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it is, even at this day, of very considerable consequence.

 The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or once a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to him, can never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders.

In what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms.

But, in modern war, the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of arms.

 Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the best.

In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach nearest to standing armies.

The Highland militia, when it served under its own chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind.

As the Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times, accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place;

so, in time of war, they were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or to continue for any long time in the field.

When they had acquired any booty, they were eager to return home, and his authority was seldom sufficient to detain them.

In point of obedience, they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs.

As the Highlanders, too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air, they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less expert in the use of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

 A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a standing army.

The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies.

What they were before they took the field, is of little importance.

They necessarily become in every respect a standing army, after they have passed a few campaigns in it.

Should the war in America drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become, in every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the valour appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.

 This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will be found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well regulated standing army has over a militia.

 One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon.

His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army.

When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army.

It vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great Persian empire.

The fall of the Greek republics, and of the Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible superiority which a standing arm has over every other sort of militia.

It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

 The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second.

All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

 From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command;

Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa; and lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain.

The army which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army.

The Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence;

and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed.

The Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia opposed to a standing army.

This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

 The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it;

and, in a few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from that country.

 Annibal was ill supplied from home.

The Roman militia, being continually in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a well disciplined and well exercised standing army;

and the superiority of Annibal grew every day less and less.

Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy.

In this march, he is said to have been misled by his guides;

and in a country which he did not know, was surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

 When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a militia inferior to his own.

He conquered and subdued that militia, and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well disciplined and well exercised standing army.

That standing army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it.

In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the standing army of Annibal.

The disheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal.

The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival republics.

 From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies.

The standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms.

In the height of their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles, to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king.

The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of Rome.

The militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better.

The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second Carthaginian war.

The Parthian and German militias, too, were always respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very considerable advantages over the Roman armies.

In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior;

and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large.

The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their ancestors.

The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same chiefs whom they were accustomed to follow in peace.

‘Their militia was exactly of the same kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were probably descended.

 Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies.

Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes.

In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome.

Under the Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals.

In order to render them less formidable, according to some authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion.

Small bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades men, artificers, and manufacturers.

The civil came to predominate over the military character;

and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the western empire.

It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend themselves.

The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account.

It was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation;

which the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers.

The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias, in exercise and discipline inferior to themselves.

Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire;

and such, too, were those which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that of the Austrians and Burgundians.

 The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established themselves upon ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their original country.

It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed to obey in peace.

It was, therefore, tolerably well exercised, and tolerably well disciplined.

As arts and industry advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises.

Both the discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of it.

When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its neighbours should follow the example.

They soon found that their safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

 The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops, and, the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced veterans.

In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe.

The Russian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy.

When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for about eight-and-twenty years.

The valour of her soldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war.

In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes forget their skill;

but where a well regulated standing army has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

 When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood.

The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation.

A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia.

Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour.

It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any considerable time.

 As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized.

A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any.

Whoever examines with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing army.

It is the instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations.

That degree of order and internal peace, which that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

 Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as dangerous to liberty.

It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general, and that of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the state.

The standing army of Caesar destroyed the Roman republic.

The standing army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors.

But where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army;

where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty.

On the contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty.

The security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.

Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent;

where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it.

To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances, can give little disturbance.

He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so.

That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army.

It is in such countries only, that the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.

 The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization.

The military force of the society, which originally cost the sovereign no expense, either in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

 The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire-arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war.

Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive.

A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows;

a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta.

The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense.

The javelins and arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked up again, and were, besides, of very little value.

The cannon and the mortar are not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta;

and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it.

As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over that of the ancients, is very great;

it has become much more difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack of that superior artillery.

In modern times, many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive.

The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

 In modern war, the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expense;

and, consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation.

In ancient times, the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations.

In modern times, the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized.

The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable, both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.

 PART II. Of the Expense of Justice

 The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires two very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.

 Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour;

so there is seldom any established magistrate, or any regular administration of justice.

Men who have no property, can injure one another only in their persons or reputations.

But when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no benefit.

It is otherwise with the injuries to property.

The benefit of the person who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers it.

Envy, malice, or resentment, are the only passions which can prompt one man to injure another in his person or reputation.

But the greater part of men are not very frequently under the influence of those passions;

and the very worst men are so only occasionally.

As their gratification, too, how agreeable soever it may be to certain characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is, in the greater part of men, commonly restrained by prudential considerations.

Men may live together in society with some tolerable degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions.

But avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property;

passions much more steady in their operation, and much more universal in their influence.

Wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality.

For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many.

The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions.

It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security.

He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it.

The acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil government.

Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not so necessary.

 Civil government supposes a certain subordination.

But as the necessity of civil government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable property;

so the principal causes, which naturally introduce subordination, gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property.

 The causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or which naturally and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some superiority over the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in number.

 The first of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of personal qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body;

of wisdom and virtue; of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind.

The qualifications of the body, unless supported by those of the mind, can give little authority in any period of society.

He is a very strong man, who, by mere strength of body, can force two weak ones to obey him.

The qualifications of the mind can alone give very great authority.

They are however, invisible qualities;

always disputable, and generally disputed.

No society, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to settle the rules of precedency of rank and subordination, according to those invisible qualities;

but according to something that is more plain and palpable.

 The second of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of age.

An old man, provided his age is not so far advanced as to give suspicion of dotage, is everywhere more respected than a young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities.

Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the sole foundation of rank and precedency.

Among them, father is the appellation of a superior;

brother, of an equal; and son, of an inferior.

In the most opulent and civilized nations, age regulates rank among those who are in every other respect equal;

and among whom, therefore, there is nothing else to regulate it.

Among brothers and among sisters, the eldest always takes place;

and in the succession of the paternal estate, every thing which cannot be divided, but must go entire to one person, such as a title of honour, is in most cases given to the eldest.

Age is a plain and palpable quality, which admits of no dispute.

 The third of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of fortune.

The authority of riches, however, though great in every age of society, is, perhaps, greatest in the rudest ages of society, which admits of any considerable inequality of fortune.

A Tartar chief, the increase of whose flocks and herds is sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well employ that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand men.

The rude state of his society does not afford him any manufactured produce any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of his rude produce which is over and above his own consumption.

The thousand men whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for their subsistence, must both obey his orders in war, and submit to his jurisdiction in peace.

He is necessarily both their general and their judge, and his chieftainship is the necessary effect of the superiority of his fortune.

In an opulent and civilized society, a man may possess a much greater fortune, and yet not be able to command a dozen of people.

Though the produce of his estate may be sufficient to maintain, and may, perhaps, actually maintain, more than a thousand people, yet, as those people pay for every thing which they get from him, as he gives scarce any thing to any body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is scarce anybody who considers himself as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority extends only over a few menial servants.

The authority of fortune, however, is very great, even in an opulent and civilized society.

That it is much greater than that either of age or of personal qualities, has been the constant complaint of every period of society which admitted of any considerable inequality of fortune.

The first period of society, that of hunters, admits of no such inequality.

Universal poverty establishes their universal equality;

and the superiority, either of age or of personal qualities, are the feeble, but the sole foundations of authority and subordination.

There is, therefore, little or no authority or subordination in this period of society.

The second period of society, that of shepherds, admits of very great inequalities of fortune, and there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives so great authority to those who possess it.

There is no period, accordingly, in which authority and subordination are more perfectly established.

The authority of an Arabian scherif is very great;

that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical.

 The fourth of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of birth.

Superiority of birth supposes an ancient superiority of fortune in the family of the person who claims it.

All families are equally ancient;

and the ancestors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be more numerous than those of the beggar.

Antiquity of family means everywhere the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is commonly either founded upon wealth, or accompanied with it.

Upstart greatness is everywhere less respected than ancient greatness.

The hatred of usurpers, the love of the family of an ancient monarch, are in a great measure founded upon the contempt which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the latter.

As a military officer submits, without reluctance, to the authority of a superior by whom he has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set over his head;

so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their ancestors have always submitted;

but are fired with indignation when another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any such superiority, assumes a dominion over them.

 The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth.

The son of a wise and brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit, who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward.

The difference, however will not be very great;

and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world, whose illustration was entirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.

 The distinction of birth not only may, but always does, take place among nations of shepherds.

Such nations are always strangers to every sort of luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be dissipated among them by improvident profusion.

There are no nations, accordingly, who abound more in families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a long race of great and illustrious ancestors;

because there are no nations among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families.

 Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one man above another.

They are the two great sources of personal distinction, and are, therefore, the principal causes which naturally establish authority and subordination among men.

Among nations of shepherds, both those causes operate with their full force.

The great shepherd or herdsman, respected on account of his great wealth, and of the great number of those who depend upon him for subsistence, and revered on account of the nobleness of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity or his illustrious family, has a natural authority over all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde or clan.

He can command the united force of a greater number of people than any of them.

His military power is greater than that of any of them.

In time of war, they are all of them naturally disposed to muster themselves under his banner, rather than under that of any other person;

and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him some sort of executive power.

By commanding, too, the united force of a greater number of people than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of them, who may have injured another, to compensate the wrong.

He is the person, therefore, to whom all those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up for protection.

It is to him that they naturally complain of the injuries which they imagine have been done to them;

and his interposition, in such cases, is more easily submitted to, even by the person complained of, than that of any other person would be.

His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him some sort of judicial authority.

 It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the inequality of fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a degree of authority and subordination, which could not possibly exist before.

It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation;

and it seems to do this naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that necessity.

The consideration of that necessity comes, no doubt, afterwards, to contribute very much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination.

The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things, which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages.

Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of their property, in order that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of theirs.

All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel, that the security of their own herds and flocks depends upon the security of those of the great shepherd or herdsman;

that the maintenance of their lesser authority depends upon that of his greater authority;

and that upon their subordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in subordination to them.

They constitute a sort of little nobility, who feel themselves interested to defend the property, and to support the authority, of their own little sovereign, in order that he may be able to defend their property, and to support their authority.

Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in reality, instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.

 The judicial authority of such a sovereign, however, far from being a cause of expense, was, for a long time, a source of revenue to him.

The persons who applied to him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and a present never failed to accompany a petition.

After the authority of the sovereign, too, was thoroughly established, the person found guilty, over and above the satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was like-wise forced to pay an amercement to the sovereign.

He had given trouble, he had disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord the king, and for those offences an amercement was thought due.

In the Tartar governments of Asia, in the governments of Europe which were founded by the German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the administration of justice was a considerable source of revenue, both to the sovereign, and to all the lesser chiefs or lords who exercised under him any particular jurisdiction, either over some particular tribe or clan, or over some particular territory or district.

Originally, both the sovereign and the inferior chiefs used to exercise this jurisdiction in their own persons.

Afterwards, they universally found it convenient to delegate it to some substitute, bailiff, or judge.

This substitute, however, was still obliged to account to his principal or constituent for the profits of the jurisdiction.

Whoever reads the instructions (They are to be found in Tyrol’s History of England) which were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II will see clearly that those judges were a sort of itinerant factors, sent round the country for the purpose of levying certain branches of the king’s revenue.

In those days, the administration of justice not only afforded a certain revenue to the sovereign, but, to procure this revenue, seems to have been one of the principal advantages which he proposed to obtain by the administration of justice.

 This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the purposes of revenue, could scarce fail to be productive of several very gross abuses.

The person who applied for justice with a large present in his hand, was likely to get something more than justice;

while he who applied for it with a small one was likely to get something less.

Justice, too, might frequently be delayed, in order that this present might be repeated.

The amercement, besides, of the person complained of, might frequently suggest a very strong reason for finding him in the wrong, even when he had not really been so.

That such abuses were far from being uncommon, the ancient history of every country in Europe bears witness.

 When the sovereign or chief exercises his judicial authority in his own person, how much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce possible to get any redress;

because there could seldom be any body powerful enough to call him to account.

When he exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might sometimes be had.

If it was for his own benefit only, that the bailiff had been guilty of an act of injustice, the sovereign himself might not always be unwilling to punish him, or to oblige him to repair the wrong.

But if it was for the benefit of his sovereign;

if it was in order to make court to the person who appointed him, and who might prefer him, that he had committed any act of oppression;

redress would, upon most occasions, be as impossible as if the sovereign had committed it himself.

In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all those ancient governments of Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have been extremely corrupt;

far from being quite equal and impartial, even under the best monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst.

 Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or flocks.

Among those nations of husbandmen, who are but just come out of the shepherd state, and who are not much advanced beyond that state, such as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors, when they first settled upon the ruins of the western empire;

the sovereign or chief is, in the same manner, only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained in the same manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or from what, in modern Europe, was called the demesne of the crown.

His subjects, upon ordinary occasions, contribute nothing to his support, except when, in order to protect them from the oppression of some of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need of his authority.

The presents which they make him upon such occasions constitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except, perhaps, upon some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them.

When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles, for his friendship, the sovereignty of seven Greek cities, the sole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him with presents.

As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice, or what may be called the fees of court, constituted, in this manner, the whole ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should give them up altogether.

It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should regulate and ascertain them.

But after they had been so regulated and ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them beyond those regulations, was still very difficult, not to say impossible.

During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.

 But when, from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing expense of defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the private estate of the sovereign had become altogether insufficient for defraying the expense of the sovereignty;

and when it had become necessary that the people should, for their own security, contribute towards this expense by taxes of different kinds;

it seems to have been very commonly stipulated, that no present for the administration of justice should, under any pretence, be accepted either by the sovereign, or by his bailiffs and substitutes, the judges.

Those presents, it seems to have been supposed, could more easily be abolished altogether, than effectually regulated and ascertained.

Fixed salaries were appointed to the judges, which were supposed to compensate to them the loss of whatever might have been their share of the ancient emoluments of justice;

as the taxes more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of his.

Justice was then said to be administered gratis.

 Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country.

Lawyers and attorneys, at least, must always be paid by the parties;

and if they were not, they would perform their duty still worse than they actually perform it.

The fees annually paid to lawyers and attorneys, amount, in every court, to a much greater sum than the salaries of the judges.

The circumstance of those salaries being paid by the crown, can nowhere much diminish the necessary expense of a law-suit.

But it was not so much to diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were prohibited from receiving my present or fee from the parties.

 The office of judge is in itself so very honourable, that men are willing to accept of it, though accompanied with very small emoluments.

The inferior office of justice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in most cases with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater part of our country gentlemen.

The salaries of all the different judges, high and low, together with the whole expense of the administration and execution of justice, even where it is not managed with very good economy, makes, in any civilized country, but a very inconsiderable part of the whole expense of government.

 The whole expense of justice, too, might easily be defrayed by the fees of court;

and, without exposing the administration of justice to any real hazard of corruption, the public revenue might thus be entirely discharged from a certain, though perhaps but a small incumbrance.

It is difficult to regulate the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is to share in them and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from them.

It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap any benefit from them.

The law can very easily oblige the judge to respect the regulation though it might not always be able to make the sovereign respect it.

Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained where they are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions among the different judges after the process is decided and not till it is decided;

there seems to be no more danger of corruption than when such fees are prohibited altogether.

Those fees, without occasioning any considerable increase in the expense of a law-suit, might be rendered fully sufficient for defraying the whole expense of justice.

But not being paid to the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the diligence of the court in examining and deciding it.

In courts which consisted of a considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the number of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either in the court, or in a committee, by order of the court, those fees might give some encouragement to the diligence of each particular judge.

Public services are never better performed, than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them.

In the different parliaments of France, the fees of court (called epices and vacations) constitute the far greater part of the emoluments of the judges.

After all deductions are made, the neat salary paid by the crown to a counsellor or judge in the parliament of Thoulouse, in rank and dignity the second parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to 150 livres, about £6:11s. sterling a-year.

About seven years ago, that sum was in the same place the ordinary yearly wages of a common footman.

The distribution of these epices, too, is according to the diligence of the judges.

A diligent judge gains a comfortable, though moderate revenue, by his office;

an idle one gets little more than his salary.

Those parliaments are, perhaps, in many respects, not very convenient courts of justice;

but they have never been accused;

they seem never even to have been suspected of corruption.

 The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of the different courts of justice in England.

Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction.

The court of king’s bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits;

the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanour.

The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king’s revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts;

the planitiff alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay him.

In consequence of such fictions, it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties, before what court they would choose to have their cause tried, and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could.

The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally, in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently took place between their respective judges: each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit, for every sort of injustice.

Originally, the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract.

The court of chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the specific performance of agreements.

When the breach of contract consisted in the non-payment of money, the damage sustained could be compensated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specific performance of the agreement.

In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was sufficient.

It was not so in others.

When the tenant sued his lord for having unjustly outed him of his lease, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the possession of the land.

Such causes, therefore, for some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no small loss of the courts of law.

It was to draw back such causes to themselves, that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of land.

 A stamp-duty upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be levied by that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges, and other officers belonging to it, might in the same manner, afford a revenue sufficient for defraying the expense of the administration of justice, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.

The judges, indeed, might in this case, be under the temptation of multiplying unnecessarily the proceedings upon every cause, in order to increase, as much as possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty.

It has been the custom in modern Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attorneys and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write;

the court, however, requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line so many words.

In order to increase their payment, the attorneys and clerks have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the law language of, I believe, every court of justice in Europe.

A like temptation might, perhaps, occasion a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.

 But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its own expense, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed salaries paid to them from some other fund, it does not seen necessary that the person or persons entrusted with the executive power should be charged with the management of that fund, or with the payment of those salaries.

That fund might arise from the rent of landed estates, the management of each estate being entrusted to the particular court which was to be maintained by it.

That fund might arise even from the interest of a sum of money, the lending out of which might, in the same manner, be entrusted to the court which was to be maintained by it.

A part, though indeed but a small part of the salary of the judges of the court of session in Scotland, arises from the interest of a sum of money.

The necessary instability of such a fund seems, however, to render it an improper one for the maintenance of an institution which ought to last for ever.

 The separation of the judicial from the executive power, seems originally to have arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of its increasing improvement.

The administration of justice became so laborious and so complicated a duty, as to require the undivided attention of the person to whom it was entrusted.

The person entrusted with the executive power, not having leisure to attend to the decision of private causes himself, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his stead.

In the progress of the Roman greatness, the consul was too much occupied with the political affairs of the state, to attend to the administration of justice.

A praetor, therefore, was appointed to administer it in his stead.

In the progress of the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great lords came universally to consider the administration of justice as an office both too laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own persons.

They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it, by appointing a deputy, bailiff or judge.

 When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics.

The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a private man.

But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which he has of his own security.

In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power.

The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power.

The regular payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will, or even upon the good economy of that power.

 PART III. Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.

 The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth, is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals;

and which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or maintain.

The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.