The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal, or continually tending to equality.

If, in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments.

This, at least, would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper.

Every man’s interest would prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment.

 Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are everywhere in Europe extremely different, according to the different employments of labour and stock.

But this difference arises, partly from certain circumstances in the employments themselves, which, either really, or at least in the imagination of men, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others, and partly from the policy of Europe, which nowhere leaves things at perfect liberty.

 The particular consideration of those circumstances, and of that policy, will divide this Chapter into two parts.

 PART I.

Inequalities arising from the nature of the employments themselves.

 The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others.

First, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves;

secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them;

thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them;

fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them;

and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success in them.

 First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness, of the employment.

Thus in most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less than a journeyman weaver.

His work is much easier.

A journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman smith.

His work is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier.

A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve hours, as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight.

His work is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in day-light, and above ground.

Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions.

In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by.

Disgrace has the contrary effect.

The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business;

but it is in most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades.

The most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.

 Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the rude state of society, become, in its advanced state, their most agreeable amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from necessity.

In the advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor people who follow as a trade, what other people pursue as a pastime.

Fishermen have been so since the time of Theocritus. {See Idyllium xxi.}.

A poacher is everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain.

In countries where the rigour of the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter is not in a much better condition.

The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow them, than can live comfortably by them;

and the produce of their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market, to afford any thing but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers.

 Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same manner as the wages of labour.

The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never master of his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business.

But there is scarce any common trade in which a small stock yields so great a profit.

 Secondly, the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense, of learning the business.

 When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits.

A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines.

The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital.

It must do this too in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.

 The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common labour, is founded upon this principle.

 The policy of Europe considers the labour of all mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, as skilled labour;

and that of all country labourers as common labour.

It seems to suppose that of the former to be of a more nice and delicate nature than that of the latter.

It is so perhaps in some cases;

but in the greater part it is quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour to shew by and by.

The laws and customs of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any person for exercising the one species of labour, impose the necessity of an apprenticeship, though with different degrees of rigour in different places.

They leave the other free and open to every body.

During the continuance of the apprenticeship, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to his master.

In the meantime he must, in many cases, be maintained by his parents or relations, and, in almost all cases, must be clothed by them.

Some money, too, is commonly given to the master for teaching him his trade.

They who cannot give money, give time, or become bound for more than the usual number of years;

a consideration which, though it is not always advantageous to the master, on account of the usual idleness of apprentices, is always disadvantageous to the apprentice.

In country labour, on the contrary, the labourer, while he is employed about the easier, learns the more difficult parts of his business, and his own labour maintains him through all the different stages of his employment.

It is reasonable, therefore, that in Europe the wages of mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, should be somewhat higher than those of common labourers.

They are so accordingly, and their superior gains make them, in most places, be considered as a superior rank of people.

This superiority, however, is generally very small: the daily or weekly earnings of journeymen in the more common sorts of manufactures, such as those of plain linen and woollen cloth, computed at an average, are, in most places, very little more than the day-wages of common labourers.

Their employment, indeed, is more steady and uniform, and the superiority of their earnings, taking the whole year together, may be somewhat greater.

It seems evidently, however, to be no greater than what is sufficient to compensate the superior expense of their education.

Education in the ingenious arts, and in the liberal professions, is still more tedious and expensive.

The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of painters and sculptors, of lawyers and physicians, ought to be much more liberal;

and it is so accordingly.

 The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the easiness or difficulty of learning the trade in which it is employed.

All the different ways in which stock is commonly employed in great towns seem, in reality, to be almost equally easy and equally difficult to learn.

One branch, either of foreign or domestic trade, cannot well be a much more intricate business than another.

 Thirdly, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the constancy or inconstancy of employment.

 Employment is much more constant in some trades than in others.

In the greater part of manufactures, a journeyman maybe pretty sure of employment almost every day in the year that he is able to work.

A mason or bricklayer, on the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon the occasional calls of his customers.

He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without any.

What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion.

Where the computed earnings of the greater part of manufacturers, accordingly, are nearly upon a level with the day-wages of common labourers, those of masons and bricklayers are generally from one-half more to double those wages.

Where common labourers earn four or five shillings a-week, masons and bricklayers frequently earn seven and eight;

where the former earn six, the latter often earn nine and ten;

and where the former earn nine and ten, as in London, the latter commonly earn fifteen and eighteen.

No species of skilled labour, however, seems more easy to learn than that of masons and bricklayers.

Chairmen in London, during the summer season, are said sometimes to be employed as bricklayers.

The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the recompence of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy of their employment.

 A house-carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer and a more ingenious trade than a mason.

In most places, however, for it is not universally so, his day-wages are somewhat lower.

His employment, though it depends much, does not depend so entirely upon the occasional calls of his customers;

and it is not liable to be interrupted by the weather.

 When the trades which generally afford constant employment, happen in a particular place not to do so, the wages of the workmen always rise a good deal above their ordinary proportion to those of common labour.

In London, almost all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and dismissed by their masters from day to day, and from week to week, in the same manner as day-labourers in other places.

The lowest order of artificers, journeymen tailors, accordingly, earn their half-a-crown a-day, though eighteen pence may be reckoned the wages of common labour.

In small towns and country villages, the wages of journeymen tailors frequently scarce equal those of common labour;

but in London they are often many weeks without employment, particularly during the summer.

 When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages of the most common labour above those of the most skilful artificers.

A collier working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly about double, and, in many parts of Scotland, about three times, the wages of common labour.

His high wages arise altogether from the hardship, disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his work.

His employment may, upon most occasions, be as constant as he pleases.

The coal-heavers in London exercise a trade which, in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness, almost equals that of colliers;

and, from the unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals of coal-ships, the employment of the greater part of them is necessarily very inconstant.

If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the wages of common labour, it ought not to seem unreasonable that coal-heavers should sometimes earn four and five times those wages.

In the inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that, at the rate at which they were then paid, they could earn from six to ten shillings a-day.

Six shillings are about four times the wages of common labour in London; and, in every particular trade, the lowest common earnings may always be considered as those of the far greater number.

How extravagant soever those earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business, there would soon be so great a number of competitors, as, in a trade which has no exclusive privilege, would quickly reduce them to a lower rate.

 The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot affect the ordinary profits of stock in any particular trade.

Whether the stock is or is not constantly employed, depends, not upon the trade, but the trader.

 Fourthly, the wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust which must be reposed in the workmen.

 The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those of many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity, on account of the precious materials with which they are entrusted.

We trust our health to the physician, our fortune, and sometimes our life and reputation, to the lawyer and attorney.

Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition.

Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires.

The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.

 When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust;

and the credit which he may get from other people, depends, not upon the nature of the trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity and prudence.

The different rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade, cannot arise from the different degrees of trust reposed in the traders.

 Fifthly, the wages of labour in different employments vary according to the probability or improbability of success in them.

 The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the employments to which he is educated, is very different in different occupations.

In the greatest part of mechanic trades success is almost certain;

but very uncertain in the liberal professions.

Put your son apprentice to a shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair of shoes;

but send him to study the law, it as at least twenty to one if he ever makes such proficiency as will enable him to live by the business.

In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks.

In a profession, where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty.

The counsellor at law, who, perhaps, at near forty years of age, begins to make something by his profession, ought to receive the retribution, not only of his own so tedious and expensive education, but of that of more than twenty others, who are never likely to make any thing by it.

How extravagant soever the fees of counsellors at law may sometimes appear, their real retribution is never equal to this.

Compute, in any particular place, what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to be annually spent, by all the different workmen in any common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, and you will find that the former sum will generally exceed the latter.

But make the same computation with regard to all the counsellors and students of law, in all the different Inns of Court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a very small proportion to their annual expense, even though you rate the former as high, and the latter as low, as can well be done.

The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery;

and that as well as many other liberal and honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gain, evidently under-recompensed.

 Those professions keep their level, however, with other occupations;

and, notwithstanding these discouragements, all the most generous and liberal spirits are eager to crowd into them.

Two different causes contribute to recommend them.

First, the desire of the reputation which attends upon superior excellence in any of them;

and, secondly, the natural confidence which every man has, more or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune.

 To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most decisive mark of what is called genius, or superior talents.

The public admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities makes always a part of their reward;

a greater or smaller, in proportion as it is higher or lower in degree.

It makes a considerable part of that reward in the profession of physic;

a still greater, perhaps, in that of law;

in poetry and philosophy it makes almost the whole.

 There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents, of which the possession commands a certain sort of admiration, but of which the exercise, for the sake of gain, is considered, whether from reason or prejudice, as a sort of public prostitution.

The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of those who exercise them in this manner, must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour, and expense of acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the employment of them as the means of subsistence.

The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc.

are founded upon those two principles;

the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit of employing them in this manner.

It seems absurd at first sight, that we should despise their persons, and yet reward their talents with the most profuse liberality.

While we do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other,

Should the public opinion or prejudice ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary recompence would quickly diminish.

More people would apply to them, and the competition would quickly reduce the price of their labour.

Such talents, though far from being common, are by no means so rare as imagined.

Many people possess them in great perfection, who disdain to make this use of them;

and many more are capable of acquiring them, if any thing could be made honourably by them.

 The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages.

Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been less taken notice of.

It is, however, if possible, still more universal.

There is no man living, who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it.

The chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it is worth.

 That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the universal success of lotteries.

The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see, a perfectly fair lottery, or one in which the whole gain compensated the whole loss;

because the undertaker could make nothing by it.

In the state lotteries, the tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the original subscribers, and yet commonly sell in the market for twenty, thirty, and sometimes forty per cent.

advance.

The vain hopes of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of this demand.

The soberest people scarce look upon it as a folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or twenty thousand pounds, though they know that even that small sum is perhaps twenty or thirty per cent.

more than the chance is worth.

In a lottery in which no prize exceeded twenty pounds, though in other respects it approached much nearer to a perfectly fair one than the common state lotteries, there would not be the same demand for tickets.

In order to have a better chance for some of the great prizes, some people purchase several tickets;

and others, small shares in a still greater number.

There is not, however, a more certain proposition in mathematics, than that the more tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a loser.

Adventure upon all the tickets in the lottery, and you lose for certain;

and the greater the number of your tickets, the nearer you approach to this certainty.

 That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and scarce ever valued more than it is worth, we may learn from the very moderate profit of insurers.

In order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at all, the common premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been drawn from an equal capital employed in any common trade.

The person who pays no more than this, evidently pays no more than the real value of the risk, or the lowest price at which he can reasonably expect to insure it.

But though many people have made a little money by insurance, very few have made a great fortune;

and, from this consideration alone, it seems evident enough that the ordinary balance of profit and loss is not more advantageous in this than in other common trades, by which so many people make fortunes.

Moderate, however, as the premium of insurance commonly is, many people despise the risk too much to care to pay it.

Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in twenty, or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from fire.

Sea-risk is more alarming to the greater part of people;

and the proportion of ships insured to those not insured is much greater.

Many sail, however, at all seasons, and even in time of war, without any insurance.

This may sometimes, perhaps, be done without any imprudence.

When a great company, or even a great merchant, has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they may, as it were, insure one another.

The premium saved up on them all may more than compensate such losses as they are likely to meet with in the common course of chances.

The neglect of insurance upon shipping, however, in the same manner as upon houses, is, in most cases, the effect of no such nice calculation, but of mere thoughtless rashness, and presumptuous contempt of the risk.

 The contempt of risk, and the presumptuous hope of success, are in no period of life more active than at the age at which young people choose their professions.

How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of balancing the hope of good luck, appears still more evidently in the readiness of the common people to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea, than in the eagerness of those of better fashion to enter into what are called the liberal professions.

 What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough.

Without regarding the danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the beginning of a new war;

and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur.

These romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood.

Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and, in actual service, their fatigues are much greater.

 The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous as that of the army.

The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea with his father’s consent;

but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it.

Other people see some chance of his making something by the one trade;

nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing by the other.

The great admiral is less the object of public admiration than the great general;

and the highest success in the sea service promises a less brilliant fortune and reputation than equal success in the land.

The same difference runs through all the inferior degrees of preferment in both.

By the rules of precedency, a captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the army;

but he does not rank with him in the common estimation.

As the great prizes in the lottery are less, the smaller ones must be more numerous.

Common sailors, therefore, more frequently get some fortune and preferment than common soldiers;

and the hope of those prizes is what principally recommends the trade.

Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to that of almost any artificers;

and though their whole life is one continual scene of hardship and danger;

yet for all this dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and dangers, while they remain in the condition of common sailors, they receive scarce any other recompence but the pleasure of exercising the one and of surmounting the other.

Their wages are not greater than those of common labourers at the port which regulates the rate of seamen’s wages.

As they are continually going from port to port, the monthly pay of those who sail from all the different ports of Great Britain, is more nearly upon a level than that of any other workmen in those different places;

and the rate of the port to and from which the greatest number sail, that is, the port of London, regulates that of all the rest.

At London, the wages of the greater part of the different classes of workmen are about double those of the same classes at Edinburgh.

But the sailors who sail from the port of London, seldom earn above three or four shillings a month more than those who sail from the port of Leith, and the difference is frequently not so great.

In time of peace, and in the merchant-service, the London price is from a guinea to about seven-and-twenty shillings the calendar month.

A common labourer in London, at the rate of nine or ten shillings a week, may earn in the calendar month from forty to five-and-forty shillings.

The sailor, indeed, over and above his pay, is supplied with provisions.

Their value, however, may not perhaps always exceed the difference between his pay and that of the common labourer;

and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be clear gain to the sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife and family, whom he must maintain out of his wages at home.

 The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them.

A tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to send her son to school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships, and the conversation and adventures of the sailors, should entice him to go to sea.

The distant prospect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate ourselves by courage and address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not raise the wages of labour in any employment.

It is otherwise with those in which courage and address can be of no avail.

In trades which are known to be very unwholesome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high.

Unwholesomeness is a species of disagreeableness, and its effects upon the wages of labour are to be ranked under that general head.

 In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary rate of profit varies more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns.

These are, in general, less uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in some branches of foreign trade than in others;

in the trade to North America, for example, than in that to Jamaica.

The ordinary rate of profit always rises more or less with the risk.

It does not, however, seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as to compensate it completely.

Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous trades.

The most hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler, though, when the adventure succeeds, it is likewise the most profitable, is the infallible road to bankruptcy.

The presumptuous hope of success seems to act here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their competition reduces the profit below what is sufficient to compensate the risk.

To compensate it completely, the common returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits of stock, not only to make up for all occasional losses, but to afford a surplus profit to the adventurers, of the same nature with the profit of insurers.

But if the common returns were sufficient for all this, bankruptcies would not be more frequent in these than in other trades.

 Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two only affect the profits of stock;

the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the business, and the risk or security with which it is attended.

In point of agreeableness or disagreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far greater part of the different employments of stock, but a great deal in those of labour;

and the ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk, does not always seem to rise in proportion to it.

It should follow from all this, that, in the same society or neighbourhood, the average and ordinary rates of profit in the different employments of stock should be more nearly upon a level than the pecuniary wages of the different sorts of labour.

 They are so accordingly.

The difference between the earnings of a common labourer and those of a well employed lawyer or physician, is evidently much greater than that between the ordinary profits in any two different branches of trade.

The apparent difference, besides, in the profits of different trades, is generally a deception arising from our not always distinguishing what ought to be considered as wages, from what ought to be considered as profit.

 Apothecaries’ profit is become a bye-word, denoting something uncommonly extravagant.

This great apparent profit, however, is frequently no more than the reasonable wages of labour.

The skill of an apothecary is a much nicer and more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever;

and the trust which is reposed in him is of much greater importance.

He is the physician of the poor in all cases, and of the rich when the distress or danger is not very great.

His reward, therefore, ought to be suitable to his skill and his trust;

and it arises generally from the price at which he sells his drugs.

But the whole drugs which the best employed apothecary in a large market-town, will sell in a year, may not perhaps cost him above thirty or forty pounds.

Though he should sell them, therefore, for three or four hundred, or at a thousand per cent.

profit, this may frequently be no more than the reasonable wages of his labour, charged, in the only way in which he can charge them, upon the price of his drugs.

The greater part of the apparent profit is real wages disguised in the garb of profit.

 In a small sea-port town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent.

upon a stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale merchant in the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent.

upon a stock of ten thousand.

The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not admit the employment of a larger capital in the business.

The man, however, must not only live by his trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which it requires.

Besides possessing a little capital, he must be able to read, write, and account and must be a tolerable judge, too, of perhaps fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapest.

He must have all the knowledge, in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him from becoming but the want of a sufficient capital.

Thirty or forty pounds a year cannot be considered as too great a recompence for the labour of a person so accomplished.

Deduct this from the seemingly great profits of his capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of stock.

The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case too, real wages.

 The difference between the apparent profit of the retail and that of the wholesale trade, is much less in the capital than in small towns and country villages.

Where ten thousand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade, the wages of the grocer’s labour must be a very trifling addition to the real profits of so great a stock.

The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer, therefore, are there more nearly upon a level with those of the wholesale merchant.

It is upon this account that goods sold by retail are generally as cheap, and frequently much cheaper, in the capital than in small towns and country villages.

Grocery goods, for example, are generally much cheaper;

bread and butchers’ meat frequently as cheap.

It costs no more to bring grocery goods to the great town than to the country village;

but it costs a great deal more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them must be brought from a much greater distance.

The prime cost of grocery goods, therefore, being the same in both places, they are cheapest where the least profit is charged upon them.

The prime cost of bread and butchers’ meat is greater in the great town than in the country village;

and though the profit is less, therefore they are not always cheaper there, but often equally cheap.

In such articles as bread and butchers’ meat, the same cause which diminishes apparent profit, increases prime cost.

The extent of the market, by giving employment to greater stocks, diminishes apparent profit;

but by requiring supplies from a greater distance, it increases prime cost.

This diminution of the one and increase of the other, seem, in most cases, nearly to counterbalance one another;

which is probably the reason that, though the prices of corn and cattle are commonly very different in different parts of the kingdom, those of bread and butchers’ meat are generally very nearly the same through the greater part of it.

 Though the profits of stock, both in the wholesale and retail trade, are generally less in the capital than in small towns and country villages, yet great fortunes are frequently acquired from small beginnings in the former, and scarce ever in the latter.

In small towns and country villages, on account of the narrowness of the market, trade cannot always be extended as stock extends.

In such places, therefore, though the rate of a particular person’s profits may be very high, the sum or amount of them can never be very great, nor consequently that of his annual accumulation.

In great towns, on the contrary, trade can be extended as stock increases, and the credit of a frugal and thriving man increases much faster than his stock.

His trade is extended in proportion to the amount of both;

and the sum or amount of his profits is in proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual accumulation in proportion to the amount of his profits.

It seldom happens, however, that great fortunes are made, even in great towns, by any one regular, established, and well-known branch of business, but in consequence of a long life of industry, frugality, and attention.

Sudden fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places, by what is called the trade of speculation.

The speculative merchant exercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business.

He is a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea merchant the year after.

He enters into every trade, when he foresees that it is likely to be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when he foresees that its profits are likely to return to the level of other trades.

His profits and losses, therefore, can bear no regular proportion to those of any one established and well-known branch of business.

A bold adventurer may sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or three successful speculations, but is just as likely to lose one by two or three unsuccessful ones.

This trade can be carried on nowhere but in great towns.

It is only in places of the most extensive commerce and correspondence that the intelligence requisite for it can be had.

 The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occasion considerable inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of stock, occasion none in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages, real or imaginary, of the different employments of either.

The nature of those circumstances is such, that they make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in others.

 In order, however, that this equality may take place in the whole of their advantages or disadvantages, three things are requisite, even where there is the most perfect freedom.

First the employments must be well known and long established in the neighbourhood;

secondly, they must be in their ordinary, or what may be called their natural state;

and, thirdly, they must be the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.

 First, this equality can take place only in those employments which are well known, and have been long established in the neighbourhood.

 Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are generally higher in new than in old trades.

When a projector attempts to establish a new manufacture, he must at first entice his workmen from other employments, by higher wages than they can either earn in their own trades, or than the nature of his work would otherwise require;

and a considerable time must pass away before he can venture to reduce them to the common level.

Manufactures for which the demand arises altogether from fashion and fancy, are continually changing, and seldom last long enough to be considered as old established manufactures.

Those, on the contrary, for which the demand arises chiefly from use or necessity, are less liable to change, and the same form or fabric may continue in demand for whole centuries together.

The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in manufactures of the former, than in those of the latter kind.

Birmingham deals chiefly in manufactures of the former kind;

Sheffield in those of the latter;

and the wages of labour in those two different places are said to be suitable to this difference in the nature of their manufactures.

 The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation from which the projector promises himself extraordinary profits.

These profits sometimes are very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps, they are quite otherwise;

but, in general, they bear no regular proportion to those of other old trades in the neighbourhood.

If the project succeeds, they are commonly at first very high.

When the trade or practice becomes thoroughly established and well known, the competition reduces them to the level of other trades.

 Secondly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in the ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of those employments.

 The demand for almost every different species of labour is sometimes greater, and sometimes less than usual.

In the one case, the advantages of the employment rise above, in the other they fall below the common level.

The demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest than during the greater part of the year;

and wages rise with the demand.

In time of war, when forty or fifty thousand sailors are forced from the merchant service into that of the king, the demand for sailors to merchant ships necessarily rises with their scarcity;

and their wages, upon such occasions, commonly rise from a guinea and seven-and-twenty shillings to forty shillings and three pounds a-month.

In a decaying manufacture, on the contrary, many workmen, rather than quit their own trade, are contented with smaller wages than would otherwise be suitable to the nature of their employment.

 The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is employed.

As the price of any commodity rises above the ordinary or average rate, the profits of at least some part of the stock that is employed in bringing it to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they sink below it.

All commodities are more or less liable to variations of price, but some are much more so than others.

In all commodities which are produced by human industry, the quantity of industry annually employed is necessarily regulated by the annual demand, in such a manner that the average annual produce may, as nearly as possible, be equal to the average annual consumption.

In some employments, it has already been observed, the same quantity of industry will always produce the same, or very nearly the same quantity of commodities.

In the linen or woollen manufactures, for example, the same number of hands will annually work up very nearly the same quantity of linen and woollen cloth.

The variations in the market price of such commodities, therefore, can arise only from some accidental variation in the demand.

A public mourning raises the price of black cloth.

But as the demand for most sorts of plain linen and woollen cloth is pretty uniform, so is likewise the price.

But there are other employments in which the same quantity of industry will not always produce the same quantity of commodities.

The same quantity of industry, for example, will, in different years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, hops, sugar tobacco, etc.

The price of such commodities, therefore, varies not only with the variations of demand, but with the much greater and more frequent variations of quantity, and is consequently extremely fluctuating;

but the profit of some of the dealers must necessarily fluctuate with the price of the commodities.

The operations of the speculative merchant are principally employed about such commodities.

He endeavours to buy them up when he foresees that their price is likely to rise, and to sell them when it is likely to fall.

 Thirdly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in such as are the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.

 When a person derives his subsistence from one employment, which does not occupy the greater part of his time, in the intervals of his leisure he is often willing to work at another for less wages than would otherwise suit the nature of the employment.

 There still subsists, in many parts of Scotland, a set of people called cottars or cottagers, though they were more frequent some years ago than they are now.

They are a sort of out-servants of the landlords and farmers.

The usual reward which they receive from their master is a house, a small garden for pot-herbs, as much grass as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an acre or two of bad arable land.

When their master has occasion for their labour, he gives them, besides, two pecks of oatmeal a-week, worth about sixteen pence sterling.

During a great part of the year, he has little or no occasion for their labour, and the cultivation of their own little possession is not sufficient to occupy the time which is left at their own disposal.

When such occupiers were more numerous than they are at present, they are said to have been willing to give their spare time for a very small recompence to any body, and to have wrought for less wages than other labourers.

In ancient times, they seem to have been common all over Europe.

In countries ill cultivated, and worse inhabited, the greater part of landlords and farmers could not otherwise provide themselves with the extraordinary number of hands which country labour requires at certain seasons.

The daily or weekly recompence which such labourers occasionally received from their masters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour.

Their small tenement made a considerable part of it.

This daily or weekly recompence, however, seems to have been considered as the whole of it, by many writers who have collected the prices of labour and provisions in ancient times, and who have taken pleasure in representing both as wonderfully low.

 The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to market than would otherwise be suitable to its nature.

Stockings, in many parts of Scotland, are knit much cheaper than they can anywhere be wrought upon the loom.

They are the work of servants and labourers who derive the principal part of their subsistence from some other employment.

More than a thousand pair of Shetland stockings are annually imported into Leith, of which the price is from fivepence to seven-pence a pair.

At Lerwick, the small capital of the Shetland islands, tenpence a-day, I have been assured, is a common price of common labour.

In the same islands, they knit worsted stockings to the value of a guinea a pair and upwards.

 The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the same way as the knitting of stockings, by servants, who are chiefly hired for other purposes.

They earn but a very scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get their livelihood by either of those trades.

In most parts of Scotland, she is a good spinner who can earn twentypence a-week.

 In opulent countries, the market is generally so extensive, that any one trade is sufficient to employ the whole labour and stock of those who occupy it.

Instances of people living by one employment, and, at the same time, deriving some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor countries.

The following instance, however, of something of the same kind, is to be found in the capital of a very rich one.

There is no city in Europe, I believe, in which house-rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnished apartment can be hired so cheap.

Lodging is not only much cheaper in London than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in Edinburgh, of the same degree of goodness;

and, what may seem extraordinary, the dearness of house-rent is the cause of the cheapness of lodging.

The dearness of house-rent in London arises, not only from those causes which render it dear in all great capitals, the dearness of labour, the dearness of all the materials of building, which must generally be brought from a great distance, and, above all, the dearness of ground-rent, every landlord acting the part of a monopolist, and frequently exacting a higher rent for a single acre of bad land in a town, than can be had for a hundred of the best in the country;

but it arises in part from the peculiar manners and customs of the people, which oblige every master of a family to hire a whole house from top to bottom.

A dwelling-house in England means every thing that is contained under the same roof.

In France, Scotland, and many other parts of Europe, it frequently means no more than a single storey.

A tradesman in London is obliged to hire a whole house in that part of the town where his customers live.

His shop is upon the ground floor, and he and his family sleep in the garret;

and he endeavours to pay a part of his house-rent by letting the two middle storeys to lodgers.

He expects to maintain his family by his trade, and not by his lodgers.

Whereas at Paris and Edinburgh, people who let lodgings have commonly no other means of subsistence;

and the price of the lodging must pay, not only the rent of the house, but the whole expense of the family.

 PART II.—Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe.

 Such are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, which the defect of any of the three requisites above mentioned must occasion, even where there is the most perfect liberty.

But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect liberty, occasions other inequalities of much greater importance.

 It does this chiefly in the three following ways.

First, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them;

secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what it naturally would be;

and, thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to place.

 First, The policy of Europe occasions a very important inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them.

 The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes use of for this purpose.

 The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily restrains the competition, in the town where it is established, to those who are free of the trade.

To have served an apprenticeship in the town, under a master properly qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining this freedom.

The bye-laws of the corporation regulate sometimes the number of apprentices which any master is allowed to have, and almost always the number of years which each apprentice is obliged to serve.

The intention of both regulations is to restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into the trade.

The limitation of the number of apprentices restrains it directly.

A long term of apprenticeship restrains it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing the expense of education.

 In Sheffield, no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a time, by a bye-law of the corporation.

In Norfolk and Norwich, no master weaver can have more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five pounds a-month to the king.

No master hatter can have more than two apprentices anywhere in England, or in the English plantations, under pain of forfeiting;

five pounds a-month, half to the king, and half to him who shall sue in any court of record.

Both these regulations, though they have been confirmed by a public law of the kingdom, are evidently dictated by the same corporation-spirit which enacted the bye-law of Sheffield.

The silk-weavers in London had scarce been incorporated a year, when they enacted a bye-law, restraining any master from having more than two apprentices at a time.

It required a particular act of parliament to rescind this bye-law.

 Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term established for the duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of incorporated trades.

All such incorporations were anciently called universities, which, indeed, is the proper Latin name for any incorporation whatever.

The university of smiths, the university of tailors, etc.

are expressions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient towns.

When those particular incorporations, which are now peculiarly called universities, were first established, the term of years which it was necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient.

As to have wrought seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary, in order to entitle any person to become a master, and to have himself apprentices in a common trade;

so to have studied seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary to entitle him to become a master, teacher, or doctor (words anciently synonymous), in the liberal arts, and to have scholars or apprentices (words likewise originally synonymous) to study under him.

 By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship, it was enacted, that no person should, for the future, exercise any trade, craft, or mystery, at that time exercised in England, unless he had previously served to it an apprenticeship of seven years at least;

and what before had been the bye-law of many particular corporations, became in England the general and public law of all trades carried on in market towns.

For though the words of the statute are very general, and seem plainly to include the whole kingdom, by interpretation its operation has been limited to market towns;

it having been held that, in country villages, a person may exercise several different trades, though he has not served a seven years apprenticeship to each, they being necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the number of people frequently not being sufficient to supply each with a particular set of hands.

By a strict interpretation of the words, too, the operation of this statute has been limited to those trades which were established in England before the 5th of Elizabeth, and has never been extended to such as have been introduced since that time.

This limitation has given occasion to several distinctions, which, considered as rules of police, appear as foolish as can well be imagined.