What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself?

 Where does the authority of society begin?

 How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?

 Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it.

 To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested;

to society, the part which chiefly interests society.

 Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.

 This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another;

or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights;

and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation.

 These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment.

 Nor is this all that society may do.

 The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights.

 The offender may then be justly punished by opinion though not by law.

 As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.

 But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding).

In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

 It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved.

 Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others.

 But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort.

 I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues;

they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social.

 It is equally the business of education to cultivate both.

 But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated.

 Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.

 They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations.

 But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.

 He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has;

the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect:

while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.

 The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions;

which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without.

 In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action.

 In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect;

but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise.

 Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others;

but he himself is the final judge.

 All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.

 I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies.

 This is neither possible nor desirable.

 If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration.

 He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature.

 If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow.

 There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings.

 Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself.

 It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming.

 We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours.

 We are not bound, for example, to seek his society;

we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us.

 We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates.

 We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement.

 In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself;

but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment.

 A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect—must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments;

but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.

 What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him.

 Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment.

 Encroachment on their rights;

infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights;

falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them;

unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them;

even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury—these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment.

 And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence.

 Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy;

dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation;

the love of domineering over others;

the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the πλεονεξἱα [Greek: pleonexia] of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others;

the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour;—these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness.

 They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect;

but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself.

 What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others.

 The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development;

and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.

 The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction.

 It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not.

 If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us;

but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable.

 We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error;

if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further:

instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him.

 He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment;

we shall not treat him like an enemy of society:

the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him.

 It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively.

 The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others;

and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him;

must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.

 In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.

 The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit.

 How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members?

 No person is an entirely isolated being;

it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them.

 If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community.

 If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally;

perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence;

and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good.

 Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example;

and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.

 And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it?

 If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government?

If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repress these also?

 And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them?

 There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living.

 The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now;

things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality.

 There must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.

 I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large.

 When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term.

 If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished;

but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance.

 If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same.

 George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged.

 Again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude;

but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort.

 Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it.

 In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence.

 No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk;

but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty.

 Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

 But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself;

the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.

 If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact.

 But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it.

 Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life.

 The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come;

it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom;

and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones;

but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself.

 If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences.

 Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves;

and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them;

let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences.

 Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse.

 If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke.

 No such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs;

and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins;

as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans.

With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer.

But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.

 But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.

 On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right;

because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests;

of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves.

 But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right;

for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people;

while very often it does not even mean that;

the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference.

 There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings;

as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed.

 But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it;

no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it.

 And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse.

 It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned.

 But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship?

or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience?

 In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself;

and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers.

 These teach that things are right because they are right;

because we feel them to be so.

 They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others.

 What can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?

 The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory;

and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws.

 I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling.

 That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration.

 Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils.

 And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.

 As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences.

 To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork.

 There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger.

 It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion;

but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance;

for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting.

 Their aversion to the flesh of the “unclean beast” is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example.

 Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country.

 This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries.

 Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion?

and if not, why not?

 The practice is really revolting to such a public.

 They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity.

Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution.

 It might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork.

 The only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere.

 To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic;

and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil.

 The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting.

 What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics?

Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases?

or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?

 No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties;

and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.

 The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination.

 The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of.

 Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre.

 There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned;

and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament.

How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists?

Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business?

 This is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong.

 But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country;

and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do.

 To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned.

 There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions.

 It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realised—where both society and the government are most democratic—the United States—the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular disapprobation.

 Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes.

 We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour.

 Opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members.

 It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it.

 And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service.

 If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct, which the general public asserts over people in general.

 But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent.

 Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use.

 And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country.

 The association, or “Alliance” as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its Secretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles.

 Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life.

 The organ of the Alliance, who would “deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution,” undertakes to point out the “broad and impassable barrier” which divides such principles from those of the association.

“All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me,” he says, “to be without the sphere of legislation;

all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it.”

No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz.

acts and habits which are not social, but individual;

although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs.

 Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act.

 But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer;

since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it.

 The Secretary, however, says, “I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another.”

And now for the definition of these “social rights.”

 “If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does.

 It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder.

 It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery, I am taxed to support.

 It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralising society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.”

A theory of “social rights,” the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language—being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought;

that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance.

 So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty;

there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify;

it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them:

for the moment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one's lips, it invades all the “social rights” attributed to me by the Alliance.

The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.

 Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation.

 Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom.

 And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day.

 But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure;

nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements.

 It is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others;

but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned.

 The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages:

but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings;

and they are not obliged to follow those occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument.

 If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons.

 The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong;

a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against.

“Deorum injuriæ Diis curæ.”

It remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures.

The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them.

 Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same.

 It is a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion.

 It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.

 I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism.

Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph.

 What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs;

that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob;

that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence;

that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up;

while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people.

 The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy;

which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English, and profess to be a kind of Christians.

No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution;

both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them.

 Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution;