By the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life: we have now by legislation to give it movement and will.

For the original act by which the body is formed and united still in no respect determines what it ought to do for its preservation.

 What is well and in conformity with order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions.

All justice comes from God, who is its sole source;

but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither government nor laws.

Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone;

but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual.

Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men: they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him.

Conventions and laws are therefore needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object.

In the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to him whom I nave promised nothing;

I recognise as belonging to others only what is of no use to me.

In the state of society all rights are fixed by law, and the case becomes different.

 But what, after all, is a law?

As long as we remain satisfied with attaching purely metaphysical ideas to the word, we shall go on arguing without arriving at an understanding;

and when we have defined a law of nature, we shall be no nearer the definition of a law of the State.

 I have already said that there can be no general will directed to a particular object.

Such an object must be either within or outside the State.

If outside, a will which is alien to it cannot be, in relation to it, general;

if within, it is part of the State, and in that case there arises a relation between whole and part which makes them two separate beings, of which the part is one, and the whole minus the part the other.

But the whole minus a part cannot be the whole;

and while this relation persists, there can be no whole, but only two unequal parts;

and it follows that the will of one is no longer in any respect general in relation to the other.

 But when the whole people decrees for the whole people, it is considering only itself;

and if a relation is then formed, it is between two aspects of the entire object, without there being any division of the whole.

In that case the matter about which the decree is made is, like the decreeing will general.

This act is what I call a law.

 When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that law considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract, and never a particular person or action.

Thus the law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by name.

It may set up several classes of citizens, and even lay down the qualifications for membership of these classes, but it cannot nominate such and such persons as belonging to them;

it may establish a monarchical government and hereditary succession, but it cannot choose a king, or nominate a royal family.

In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power.

 On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business it is to make laws, since they are acts of the general will:

nor whether the prince is above the law, since he is a member of the State;

nor whether the law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself;

nor how we can be both free and subject to the laws since they are but registers of our wills.

 We see further that, as the law unites universality of will with universality of object, what a man, whoever he be, commands of his own motion cannot be a law;

and even what the Sovereign commands with regard to a particular matter is no nearer being a law, but is a decree, an act, not of sovereignty, but of magistracy.

 I therefore give the name 'Republic' to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a case does the public interest govern, and the res publica rank as a reality.

Every legitimate government is republican;

what government is I will explain later on.

 Laws are, properly speaking, only the conditions of civil association.

The people, being subject to the laws, ought to be their author: the conditions of the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together to form it.

But how are they to regulate them?

Is it to be by common agreement, by a sudden inspiration?

Has the body politic an organ to declare its will?

Who can give it the foresight to formulate and announce its acts in advance?

Or how is it to announce them in the hour of need?

How can a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation?

Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it.

The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened.

It must be got to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it;

it must be shown the good road it is in search of, secured from the seductive influences of individual wills, taught to see times and spaces as a series, and made to weigh the attractions of present and sensible advantages against the danger of distant and hidden evils.

The individuals see the good they reject;

the public wills the good it does not see.

All stand equally in need of guidance.

The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason;

the latter must be taught to know what it wills.

If that is done, public enlightenment leads to the union of understanding and will in the social body:

the parts are made to work exactly together, and the whole is raised to its highest power.

This makes a legislator necessary.